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Memory, narrative, and conflict in writing the past: 
when historians undergo ethical and political strains
Memória, narrativa e conflito em escrever o passado: quando 
os historiadores estão sujeitos a tensões éticas e políticas
RESUMO
ABSTRACT
In this paper I will analyze the distinctive features of 
the twentieth century historiography with regards 
to its most salient events. By doing so, I will provide 
an interpretation of the struggles which underlay the 
production of historical knowledge at the end of the 
century. In contrast to various theories of historiography 
which assert that autonomy from collective memory 
is a methodological assumption of the historian, I will 
argue that historiography is always interwoven with the 
political and ethical challenges of the historian’s time. In 
this regard, this paper´s theses are inspired by Walter 
Benjamin’s ideas concerning historiography, as well as 
by the interpretations of his ideas provided by other 
historians and philosophers, such as Enzo Traverso, 
Dominick LaCapra or Michael Löwy. Their ideas will 
serve as a framework for understanding the challenges 
historians face when narrating contemporary history. 
Neste trabalho, analiso as distintas características da 
historiografia do século vinte em torno aos eventos mais 
proeminentes da época, para, assim, poder delinear 
uma interpretação das lutas que subjazem a produção 
do conhecimento histórico. Em contraste com várias 
teorias da historiografia que afirmam que a autonomia 
da memória coletiva é um pressuposto metodológico 
do historiador, argumentarei que a historiografia está 
sempre entrelaçada com os desafios políticos e éticos 
do tempo do historiador. A esse respeito, as teses deste 
trabalho são inspiradas nas ideias de Walter Benjamin 
sobre a historiografia, bem como pelas interpretações 
dessas premissas, fornecidas por outros historiadores 
e filósofos, como Enzo Traverso, Dominick LaCapra 
ou Michael Löwy. Suas ideias servirão de estrutura 
para compreender os desafios que os historiadores 
enfrentam ao narrar a história contemporânea.
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Introduction. The historian’s journey: From 
Extraterritoriality to Secondary Witnessing
In the recent decades, the history of the twentieth century 
has become not just an object of study, but also of debate and 
political contention. Consequently, the interests and conditions 
of the present cannot be ignored when analyzing the mechanisms 
which give the past its meaning. In this regard, the contribution 
and influence of Benjamin in this theoretical context cannot be 
overlooked. In La historia como campo de batalla, the historian 
Enzo Traverso offers a general overview of the fiercest debates 
among historians regarding the interpretation of the events 
of the past century. The guiding thread of this book is to 
bring to light the many underlying tensions in contemporary 
historiography, especially in relation to socio-political factors. 
In the introduction Traverso asserts: 
I think it is necessary to evoke Walter Benjamin’s underlying 
influence. In his writing I have found not just an answer to my 
questions, but also some useful resources for expressing my 
questions, which is a necessary assumption for any successful 
investigation […] Walter Benjamin did not bequeath a method, 
but a deep reflection regarding the means and contradictions 
that came from an intellectual perspective that, when trying to 
think about history, insists on not separating the past from the 
present (TRAVERSO 2011, p. 27).
As can be concluded from this passage, the closeness 
between the past and the present and their reciprocal influence 
are Walter Benjamin’s main theoretical contributions towards 
understanding contemporary historiography. Indeed, in this 
paper I aim to cast light on the challenges faced by historians 
at the turn of the twenty-first century, by highlighting the 
impossibility of detaching the past from the present within 
the writing of history. This idea does not just present the 
image of narrating the past as analogous to a battlefield 
when the interpretation of historical events turned out to be 
a contested issue. Furthermore, it reshapes the framework 
49
Memory, narrative, and conflict in writing the past
Hist. Historiogr. v. 13, n. 32, jan.-abr, ano 2020, p. 47-81 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v13i32.1494
within which historians have been defined. In his History, the 
Last Thing before the Last, Sigfried Kracauer asserts that, 
for trying to understand the past, which is always a “foreign 
country” (LOWENTHAL, 2015), historians can be defined as 
an extraterritorial figure. According to Kracauer, historians are 
like exiles, insofar they live between two different worlds: the 
past and the present. This condition impedes them from taking 
roots in either one of them. “He has ceased to ‘belong’. […] 
And just as he is free to step outside the culture which was 
his own, he is sufficiently uncommitted to get inside the minds 
of the foreign people in whose midst he is living” (KRACAUER 
2015, p. 84). No matter how compelling Kracauer’s ideas are, 
the features of contemporary history require us to reshape his 
definition of historian. The aforementioned interweaving of 
past and present, which became strengthened by the unfolding 
of traumatic historical events in the twentieth century runs 
counter to Kracauer’s definition. This is what Enzo Traverso 
has to say on the subject: 
The metaphor of an exile is still appropriate […] but today it 
should be nuanced. The historian of the twentieth century is an 
“exile” but also, directly or indirectly, a “witness,” who maintains 
a close relationship with the object of research in multiples 
ways. The historian’s challenge lies not in exploring a strange 
and distant universe; rather it lies on distancing him or herself 
from a past that is rather close, that he or she may have lived 
and whose traces are still alive (TRAVERSO 2012 p. 285).
In History and Memory after Auschwitz, Dominick LaCapra 
emphasizes the role of transferences, emotions, and values 
that come from a past which a historian has both experienced 
and is researching. In this work LaCapra assumes a definition 
of the historian which is diametrically opposed to the one 
proposed by Kracauer. By highlighting the ethical and political 
tensions which a historian undergoes when dealing with a 
traumatic past, LaCapra defines a historian as a “secondary 
witness” (LACAPRA 1998, p. 21). Thus, the historian’s task is 
not only to distance him or herself from a recent past, but also 
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to “work out an acceptable subject position” (LACAPRA 1998, p. 
11) in relation to the historical sources of the aforementioned 
transferences. This definition only makes sense within LaCapra’s 
new approach regarding the relations between two categories 
which have been the focus of historiographical debates during 
the last decades: on the one hand, history, and on the other 
hand, the social source of transferences that may interfere with 
the historian’s work: collective memory. LaCapra’s position 
regarding this matter is clearly synthesized in his last work: 
“The ongoing challenge is to approach the topic without 
opposing history and memory in a binary fashion but instead 
by inquiring into the more complex and challenging relations 
between them” (LACAPRA 2018, p. 81). By assuming this 
position LaCapra directly opposes theories regarding relations 
between history and memory that have been defended since 
the second quarter of the twentieth century by a heterogeneous 
group of philosophers, sociologist and historians. Pierre Nora’s 
reflections on “Lieux de memorie” is a clear example on the 
aforementioned binary understanding of the relationship 
between history and memory.
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now 
to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by 
living societies founded in their name. It remains in permanent 
evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to dormancy 
and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the 
reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is 
no longer. Memory is a perpetually current phenomenon, a bond 
tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of 
the past. Memory, insofar, since it is affective and magical, only 
accommodates those facts that suit it […]. History, because it 
is an intellectual and secular production, calls for analysis and 
criticism. Memory installs remembrance within the sacred; 
history, always prosaic, releases it again […] memory is by nature 
multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual. 
History, on the other hand, belongs to everyone and to no one, 
whence its claim to universal authority (NORA 1989, p 8). 
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Nora’s reflections regarding history and memory have been 
echoed, in various ways, by other authors such as Yosef Hayim 
Yerushalmi (2012), Kristoft Pomian (2002), Tony Judt (2006), 
Arno Mayer (1988) and David Rieff (2011). The assumption 
behind their ideas can be summarized in the following set of 
binary definitions concerning history and memory, which will 
be deeply questioned along the following sections. According 
to these authors, (1) collective memory is bound to the 
social and political purposes of strengthening cohesion within 
the community, whereas historians just produce historical 
knowledge; (2) while all the tales and testimonies that came from 
collective memory are attached to historical events, historians 
always work at a safe distance from the past; (3) collective 
memories, which depend on communicative relationships, 
are always plural, heterogeneous and polyhedral, whereas 
historical narratives tend to converge as far as their claim to 
be universally recognized; and (4) while depictions of the past 
that came from collective memory always moralize and judge 
historical agents, historians just try to understand and explain. 
Without denying these distinctions between history and memory, 
I will present an analysis of certain trends within contemporary 
history in which discontinuities and borders between history and 
memory tend to get blurred. In order to make my underlying 
argument clearer, each chapter of this paper focuses on re-
thinking one of the distinctions between history and memory 
that have been presented earlier. In this respect, the following 
analysis of contemporary history supports a non-binary 
approach to the relationships between history and memory; 
this is in line with some arguments presented by LaCapra 
and Traverso, and with some of Walter Benjamin’s theoretical 
insights from “On the Concept of History”. Despite the fact that 
historiographical strains discussed in this paper go beyond the 
scope of Walter Benjamin’s theory of history, I will point out 
instances in which the ideas presented here reflect Benjamin’s 
insights.
The principal feature of the history of the previous century is 
its “contemporaneity”, defined by a short temporal distance from 
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the time in which historians wrote about it. This contemporaneity 
allows the twentieth century history to be assimilated into the 
so-called “history of the present.” This term has been defined by 
María Inés Mudrovcic (2005), as the processes of historicisation 
of the impact of events which remain in the memory of a 
generation that is still alive when those events become part 
of a historical narration. The existence of living witnesses of 
those events is, therefore, the defining characteristic of the 
“history of the present.” This definition can never be precise 
since it depends on the biological continuity of a generation, 
which can fluctuate, as can the bonds between survivors and 
the deceased. Nonetheless, it allows us to define a temporal 
frame of approximately eighty to ninety years. Although the 
“history of the present” is as old as classic historiography, the 
interest on it has grown in the second half of the twentieth 
century. This interest was the result of events whose impact 
persisted for decades after their occurrence which in turn led 
to the social need for their explanation and contextualization. 
This is how Alicia Alted puts it in “The History of the Present or 
the Squaring of the Circle”:
From the brutality of the Second World War arose a new field 
that […] made a difference from which, until now, it will be 
considered as contemporary “classic” history.  The aftermath 
of the events from the interwar period in Europe and from the 
Second World War had shocked Western societies. The survivors 
and the public powers of the European states projected their gaze 
towards historians as they needed those facts to be explained 
(ALTED,2006, p. 33).
Retrospectivity and ideology within the history of the 
present
According to its aforementioned definition, the “history of 
the present” spans a historical period that includes the Spanish 
Civil War, the Second World War, the  Holocaust, the Gulag 
and the nuclear arms race. This is a historical framework that 
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makes the mid-century crisis the axis around which the history 
of Europe acquires its meaning. 
However, since the past is not fixed, this journey back in 
time is not the only relevant thing. On the contrary, it is also 
necessary to analyze as well how the present, from which 
history is being read, has evolved. After all, it was less than 
three decades ago that a series of events that determined our 
understanding of the history of the present unfolded. According 
to the historian Eric Hobsbawm, the fall of the Berlin Wall led 
to a new historic threshold that reconfigured the conditions 
which allowed historians to describe the events of the previous 
century (HOBSBAWN 1995). This ascertainment derived from 
the awareness that something essential occurred during that 
time. The collapse of the Soviet Union constituted an event 
that required a modification of narratives of the twentieth 
century history. There is a large difference between the writing 
of history in 1985 and in 1995, much larger than the difference 
between the description of the same set of events in 1985 and 
in 1975. Hobsbawm’s reflections on the problem of the history 
of the present perfectly summarize the ideas I am delving 
further into: 
Very few people would deny that an epoch in world history 
ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet 
Union, whatever we read into the events of 1989–91. A page in 
history has been turned. The mere fact that this is so is enough 
to change the vision of every living historian of the twentieth 
century, for it turns a tract of time into a historic period with 
its own structure and coherence or incoherence—‘the short 
twentieth century’ […] Whoever we are, we cannot fail to see 
the century as a whole differently from the way we would 
have done before 1989–91 inserted its punctuation mark 
into its flow. It would be absurd to say that we can now 
stand back from it, as we can from the nineteenth century, 
but at least we can see it as a whole. In a word, the history of 
the twentieth century written in the 1990s must be qualitatively 
different from any such history written before (HOBWBAWM 
2011, p. 237).
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A historian interpreting the events of the twentieth century 
in 1988 would have adopted a viewpoint tending toward 
binarism. First, he or she would have been tackling a convulsive 
era of world wars, ideological conflicts, and great social unrest. 
Second, since the end of the 1940s, there was a period of 
growth in the welfare state and a subsequent consolidation 
of the capitalist system that achieved global reach. Thus, the 
underlying narrative structure of the historian approach would 
have had a clear binary form: a period of crisis followed by 
one of recovery and prosperity. However, if the same historian 
assembled a retrospective vision of the twentieth century, after 
the historical threshold period 1989–1991, the framework 
would have changed radically. Not only did the Soviet regime 
collapse during this period but the capitalist economies of the 
Western world also began to be beset by serious problems that 
brought into question their stability and status as alternatives 
to their Eastern counterparts. In this sense, historians could 
no longer adopt a binary perspective but rather a ternary one, 
with the framework consisting of one period of prosperity 
amid two periods of crisis. Hence, a historian writing history 
in 1992 would not only have had to add information to an 
already large number of events from the previous years. She 
or he would have also had to change the narrative orientation, 
criteria of relevance and historical approach. In his critique of 
historicism Walter Benjamin discussed the retrospective gaze 
that underlies historical narration. “Historicism contents itself 
with establishing a causal nexus among various moments in 
history. But no state of affairs having casual significance is for 
that very reason historical. It became historical posthumously, 
as it were, through events that may be separated from it” 
(BENJAMIN 2006, p. 397). The posthumous condition of the 
historical past highlighted by Benjamin points at the relevance 
of retrospectivity within a historian’s gaze. 
These changes in teleological orientation are also linked to 
the political and ideological commitments that frame the work 
of the historian. In this way, the recognition of its influence 
allows us to anchor the historical accounts to the conditions 
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of the historian’s time. A rather significant example is the 
emergence of a liberal historiography after the historic threshold 
that was the year 1991. The end of Soviet communism was 
accompanied by changes in western historiography itself. As 
a result, many historical accounts that appeared after this 
period established causal connections that retrospectively 
attributed normative charge to the unfolding events. These 
new historical interpretations were not limited to tracing the 
features and consequences of communism in the history of the 
West. Rather, they also attributed a condition of necessity to its 
failure; its resolution was indispensable to the global triumph of 
liberal democracy; a new Hegelian end of history (FUKUYAMA 
2012). The triumph of market economy and liberal democracy 
had implications for the history of the present, through the 
establishment of historical dichotomies that blurred the outlines 
of the past. In addition to historians like Richard Pippes (1991) 
or Martin Malia (1973), François Furet and his book The Passing 
of an Illusion (FURET 2000) is the principal representative of 
this trend (TRAVERSO 2013, p. 83).
Sidestepping the contradictions and specificities of Soviet 
communism, Furet defines it merely as an ideology, or an 
“ideocracy.” According to Furet, communism was just a political 
mythology that offered a social panacea capable of mobilizing 
various political regimes in order to commit many of the largest-
scale crimes in history. The establishment of a genealogical 
connection between the French revolution and the Russian 
revolution justifies, from Furet’s perspective, the link between 
revolution and terror as an a priori fact. In this framework 
the differences between communism and fascism tend to get 
blurred. 
The only serious way to approach the study of the two original 
ideologies and political movements that appeared at the beginning 
of our century, Marxist-Leninist communism and fascism in its 
Italian and German forms, is to take them together as the two 
faces of an acute crisis of liberal democracy that arose with the 
First World War. This critique of the modern democratic idea in 
the name of a former “organic” society on the Right and in the 
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name of a “future” socialist society on the Left is a longstanding 
reality of European political culture (FURET 2004, p. 32).
In this framework, communism loses its status as an 
economic, social and philosophical theory and becomes reduced 
to a totalitarian ideology. In the same vein, the revolutionary 
and emancipatory potential of communism is also ignored 
and revolution is conflated with terror. All communist projects 
are represented as the antechamber to authoritarianism and 
genocide. This reading of events leads us to interpret the 
evolution of the twentieth century events as a polarization of 
political forces into two blocks. On the one hand, there were 
those who prioritized political mythology, such as the mythology 
of the Volk or that of a classless society. On the other hand, 
there were those who prioritize individual rights over collective 
ideologies. 
What I would like to highlight is that this specific interpretation 
of history could have only emerged out of the historical context 
subsequent to the Western victory in the Cold War and the 
decline of communism. Or rather, out of the context in which, 
after the experience of Stalinism and the imperial ambitions 
of USSR, the perversion of ideals which underlie communist 
revolution could be unambiguously certificated (PRIESTLAND 
2009, p. 273-314). Only from a point in time in which no 
political change seems to have the potential to fully affect the 
political and social order of the market economy and liberal 
democracy, can all past revolutions be interpreted as the causal 
antecedent of a collective crime perpetrated in the name of a 
political ideology. It is only from the end of this “short twentieth 
century” that it is possible to project a gaze that reduces the 
historical experience of the Soviet revolution—with all of its 
ambiguities, discontinuities, heterogeneities—to an expanse of 
ruins that equates it with fascism. 
Hence, the articulation of the history of the present is not 
only an indication of the importance of a historical context 
in which the liberal democracy appears to have triumphed 
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globally. It also requires an ideological approach to the social 
and political consequences of the aforementioned historical 
process. It is not surprising that historians like François Furet, 
Martin Malia or Richard Pippehave have been labeled as 
“conservative.” Indeed, their dichotomous readings have been 
questioned by historians (HAYNES; WOLFREYS 2007) such as 
Eric Hobsbawm, Enzo Traverso (2017), Daniel Bensaïd (2007) 
or Domenico Losurdo (, 2011), who have ideological links to the 
twentieth century failed and distorted revolutionary projects. All 
of these historians have played a leading role in one of the most 
interesting debates related to the interpretation of the history 
of the present. In constant opposition to liberal historiography, 
they have attempted to rescue the revolutionary and anti-
fascist elements of the left-wing political movements from the 
dichotomy between “barbarism or liberal democracy” that has 
constrained previous historical analyses. The result led to a 
hermeneutic conflict that is related not only to the past but also 
to the present. The elaboration of other hypotheses regarding 
the origin of violence and other evaluations of the facts were 
translated into an interpretation of “revolution” as a political 
practice with enormous emancipatory potential that does not 
necessarily lead to totalitarianism. On the contrary, such an 
interpretation can bring into question the hegemonic economic 
system as well as shed a light on its darkest sides (LOSURDO 
2011). As can be concluded by analyzing this historical debate, 
it is not possible to consider historiography detached from 
the political and ideological struggles that surround the social 
context in which historians live and work. For this reason, 
the aforementioned theories of historiography and collective 
memory, according to which the former produce historical 
knowledge whereas the latter just strengthens the bonds 
between political communities cannot be maintained. The role 
of the historian in the ethical and political controversies blurs 
the distinction between historiography and collective memory. 
The purpose behind tracing the contours of this debate is 
not to offer a solution that would end the battle for history. 
Rather, it is to describe an example of the dynamics between 
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the past and the present in the historiography of the end 
of the century. In order to offer further arguments for the 
interdependence of past and present, I will present a series 
of characteristics of the history of the past century that could 
have profoundly affected the context in which the historian 
works. Furthermore, by highlighting the features of the history 
of the present, the remaining distinctions defended by those 
that argue for a complete separation of history and memory 
will also be refuted.  
Monads and Modernist Events
The twentieth century has been characterized by both 
spontaneous and systematic indiscriminate violence: two world 
wars, civil wars, social revolts, deportations and genocides. 
These events are those in which the implementation of 
extermination techniques led to a veritable industry of death. 
The heuristic value of these phenomena stems from the fact that 
they were characterized by a rupture in the collective memories 
of the groups that inhabited this historic space, as well as for 
transgressing the traditional limits of representation. These are 
precisely the phenomena that produce what Benjamin referred 
to as the “destruction of experience.”
Experience has fallen in value. And it looks as if it is continuing 
to fall into bottomlessness. Every glance at a newspaper 
demonstrates that it has reached a new low, that our picture, 
not only of the external world but of the moral world as well, has 
undergone changes overnight which were never thought to be 
possible. With the [First] World War a process began to become 
apparent which has not halted since then. Was it not noticeable at 
the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown 
silent—not richer, but poorer in communicable experience? […] 
For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than 
strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience 
by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral 
experience by those in power (BENJAMIN 2002, p. 143).
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These events were so terrible that they became unsayable 
for their witnesses and victims and it is not possible to plot 
them into a narrative that would give them sense. Benjamin 
conceptualized the repercussions of these types of events with 
the notion of the “dialectical monad.”
In this context the recovery of benjaminian categories 
remains paradoxical. After all, his death left him at the 
threshold of a period that constitutes our history of the present. 
Nevertheless, it is for his lucidity that Benjamin is considered a 
“fire alarm” (BENJAMIN 1979), a term referring to his ability to 
anticipate the degree of barbarism that would befall the world 
in the decades that followed. Or, from his reading of his own 
present as charged with that possibility. For this reason, the 
categories that were developed in “On the Concept of History” 
are applicable to the reading of events that followed Benjamin’s 
death. In this theoretical context, Benjamin’s notion of monad 
requires a special mention. “When thinking suddenly comes to 
a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that 
constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a 
monad” (BENJAMIN 2006, p. 396). From his point of view, “the 
monad” is an event that sparks some glimpses that reflect, in the 
cognitive and ethical-political sense, a historical totality. Since 
these events constituted the outcome of tendencies inherent 
to his social context, they are, therefore, microcosms of that 
historical context. Furthermore, monads content a potentiality 
for being mobilized in order to criticize a historical situation 
which had been built above the shoulders of the victims. “In 
this structure he recognizes the sign of a […] revolutionary 
chance in the fight for the oppressed past” (BENJAMIN 2006).
The notion of the monadic event thus encompasses a 
great number of singular phenomena of the previous century: 
the extermination of Armenians at the hands of the Ottoman 
Empire at the beginning of the century, various genocides across 
Eastern Europe or the apartheid in South Africa. However, the 
principal event, the main subject in  the bibliography on the 
topic, is the Holocaust. The genocide of Jews at the hands of 
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Nazis has come to be considered as the greatest crime in the 
history of humanity, the reference point against which historians 
interpret and compare all other uses of violence. 
It is precisely its status as the “epicenter,” as well as the 
blurring of history and ethics, that allows it to be defined 
as a “modernist event.” This notion has been provided by 
the narrativistic approach to historiography, which grasps 
the distance between these types of events and traditional 
narratives. Thus, it is where its challenge to the “history of the 
present” and to the traditional position of the aloof historian is 
made clear. Hayden White defines the modernist event in these 
terms:
The twentieth century is marked by the occurrence of certain 
“holocaustal” events (two world wars, the Great Depression, 
nuclear weapons and communications technology, the population 
explosion, the mutilation of the zooesphere, famine […]) that 
bear little similarity to what earlier historians conventionally took 
as their objects of study and do not, therefore, lend themselves 
to understanding by the commonsensical techniques utilized 
in conventional historical inquiry nor even to representation 
by the techniques of writing typically favored by historians 
from Herodotus to Arthur Schlesinger. Nor does any of several 
varieties of quantitative analysis, of the kind practiced in the 
social sciences, capture the novelty of such events. Moreover, 
these kinds of events do not lend themselves to explainning in 
terms of the categories underwritten by traditional humanistic 
historiography, which features the activity of human agents 
conceived to be in some way fully conscious and morally 
responsible for their actions and capable of discriminating clearly 
between the causes of historical events and their effects over 
the long as well as the short run in relatively commonsensical 
ways” (WHITE 2012, p. 70).
In what sense do these events remain unexplained or 
unassimilated by the mechanisms of traditional historiography? 
When speaking of traditional historical discourse, I should 
allude to the possibility of a double interpretation in regard to 
what it is to explain or to represent the facts. This binomial 
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is an inheritance of the two epistemological traditions around 
which the debate regarding the state of historical knowledge 
has revolved: the positivist model that adheres to a causal 
explanation (HEMPEL 1942) and the historicist model that 
appeals to the historian’s empathetic understanding 
(COLLINGWOOD 1994) of the intentional agents involved in 
the events. It is from both parameters from which difficulties 
are presented when it comes to attributing a unitary meaning 
to this series of events. 
The reason why causal explanations do not allow us to 
assimilate this series of phenomena is that not all the phenomena 
are explicable via laws of causation. Historians cannot explain 
why the Holocaust occurred nor can they assimilate it into a 
narrative just by referring to social, economic, and political 
factors, boiled down for our comprehension with the aid of 
universal laws. There is meaning beyond the Holocaust that the 
nomological model cannot encompass, but that is as essential 
for accounting for the phenomenon itself as it is for analyzing 
the ways in which its aftermath had been faced by its witnesses 
(MATE 2004).
As for the difficulties with the mode of empathetic 
understanding, Christopher R. Browning’s theory should be used 
to account for the reluctance to employ the aforementioned 
mode in the post-Holocaust context. Let us examine a key 
quotation from one of his essays:
Can the history of such men be written? Not just the social, 
organizational, and institutional history of the units they 
belonged to. And not just the ideological and decision-making 
history of the policies which they carried out. Can one recapture 
the experiential history of these killers—the choices they faced, 
the emotions they felt, the coping mechanism they employed, 
the changes they underwent? (BROWNING 1992, p. 27).
Browning’s answer is unambiguous. The nature of these 
events is such that it is intrinsically difficult to reconstruct 
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the perspective of the executioners. These events cannot be 
explained from a perspective that is completely transparent to 
the reader, given that the activity of various historical agents 
tends to remain opaque in the face of the historian’s empathic 
efforts.  
That being said, the affirmation of the difficulties in 
representing the Holocaust emphasizes the impossibility of 
its assimilation into a narrative within a historical context 
conditioned by the consequences of its traumatic effects. It 
is precisely the influence of those traumatic effects within 
the writing of history that disqualified the aforementioned 
assumptions according to which the historian’s gaze entails a 
wide distance from the object of research. After all, the notion 
of an “absolute evil,” retrospectively linked to these historical 
events, is incompatible with the application of a narrative. The 
construction of the traditional account of the Holocaust would 
imply, first of all, a normalization of the events by adapting 
them to a traditional scheme of comprehension. Furthermore, 
it would imply a “humanization” of the executioners by 
establishing hypotheses that would allow them to become 
characters to empathize with despite the fact that the social 
and cultural context presents an imaginative resistance to 
this process. The effectiveness of this imaginative resistance 
in post-traumatic contexts is a reflection of the already cited 
interference of ethical-political factors in the process of the 
writing of history. In the words of James E. Young, “I find that it 
may be the very idea of “deep memory” and its incompatibility 
with narrative that constitutes one of the central challenges to 
Holocaust historiography” (YOUNG 1997, p. 49). It is precisely 
this incompatibility which makes the historical narratives of the 
second half of the twentieth century, not only more complex, 
but also more plural and heterogeneous. 
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The Fragmentation of Great Narratives and the Era 
of the Witness
Both Hayden White and Hans Kellner (1989) have 
suggested that the Holocaust, as a historical phenomenon, has 
been a necessary condition for the development of postmodern 
historiography. However, the connection between the Holocaust 
as a historical experience and the fragmentation of “great 
narratives” requires further support, which will be provided in 
this chapter. The Holocaust has been interpreted both as an 
effect and a confirmation of the “crisis of grand narratives”; 
a concept that has become the leitmotif of contemporary 
historical interpretation in Western culture. The “crisis of 
grand narratives” with its legitimizing potential constitutes 
an authentic topos of our time. For this reason, its influence 
on the representation of the past profoundly affects the 
idiosyncrasies of the “history of the present.” Having become 
the most obvious symptom of the supposed “end of modernity,” 
the dissolution of the great narratives runs parallel with the 
fragmentation of knowledge. As Lyotard argues in his classic 
The Postmodern Condition, (LYOTARD 2001), the absence of 
an epistemological center or monolithic block to anchor the 
roots of different branches of knowledge and criteria method 
has defined our time. Therefore, it is necessary to address the 
causes, historical and metahistorical, of this phenomenon and 
how they have affected the areas of human wisdom dedicated 
to historical knowledge. In this sense, the great narratives, as 
hegemonic forms of representing the past, are defined based on 
three characteristics whose lack of effectiveness in our present 
conditions, among other fields, in the work of historiography. 
 The features that define “great narratives” are their 
universality, the potential to provide a totalizing explanation 
for the past and a teleology through which it can articulate 
their accounts (KHOURT 2016). All of these characteristics 
are interdependent. Universality allows for the subsumption 
of the histories of particular peoples into an account that 
encompasses all of the humanity. Its totalizing impact explains 
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and justifies the suffering in history. Finally, teleology offers a 
final point in history in which, in a hypothetical future, all of its 
underlying tendencies will be fulfilled. The grand narratives are 
always configured as a structure that prefigures the meaning 
of events. It is precisely this teleological structure that permits 
the organization of events along three axes: “beginning,” 
“development” and “end.” The ending is the focal point that 
lends meaning to all historical events. They present themselves 
as the “eve of the ending,” which constitutes its prospective 
justification, as necessary elements for the achievement of 
that telos. Besides, it is precisely this end of history that serves 
as an axis to introduce the historical facts into the narrative. 
Totalizing narrative thus determines which events have historic 
value. 
The teleological connection between the development 
and the conclusion, in the historic narrative, has its parallel 
in the writing of history as the link between the past and 
the present. The retrospective gaze on the past from the 
present attributes as explanation as well as legitimation. The 
teleological unintelligibility of narrative associations allows the 
step from “this is how it happened” to “this is how it should 
have happened.” 
Furthermore, this practical potential of the narrative 
has one requirement: the ignorance of the redistribution 
of figurative meanings that implies for itself the ignorance 
of the establishment of hierarchies. Thus, it requires 
the “objectivist illusion” to make the narrative structure 
transparent, or it requires, as Hayden White argues, the “belief 
according to which the plot facts speak for themselves” (WHITE 
1985, p. 13).
However, this illusion lost its efficacy as a result of the 
crisis of the notion of progress as a model of interpretation and 
justification of the unfolding of events. The historical framework 
that accompanied and legitimized ideological progress was 
sustained by the horizon of a utopian future, the legitimizing 
source of historical actions that were necessary to achieve that 
65
Memory, narrative, and conflict in writing the past
Hist. Historiogr. v. 13, n. 32, jan.-abr, ano 2020, p. 47-81 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v13i32.1494
utopian goal. These utopic ends have parallels in the figure of the 
“conclusion” in the narrative text. Thus, the historical present 
that has still to achieve utopia would be interpreted as the eve 
of the conclusion and should be subordinated to its realization. 
In this sense, in ethical-political terms, the production of 
victims in the present would be legitimate if the future could 
only be built upon their cadavers. According to White (1987), 
there is a firm connection between law, society, and narrative. 
The end of history provides a sense and meaning to these 
political practices. However, it was precisely the Holocaust 
and its reception in European culture and philosophy, that 
disqualified the continuance of that framework. The narrative 
that accompanied modern progress could not assimilate the 
systematic crime of more than five million people nor could 
it give it sense or meaning from an a posteriori harmonizing 
ending. 
The rupture of the narrative framework that dominated the 
first half the twentieth century is not the proof of its inability 
to account for new historical experience. Furthermore, it also 
accounts for the artificial character of this model of historical 
comprehension. However, if the progressive framework of history 
stops working or loses its legitimacy, it opens the possibility for 
the articulation of different forms of representation. 
In this sense, Frank Ankersmit’s ideas in “Historiography 
and Postmodernism” are exemplary. In this essay he accounts 
for the historiographic overproduction of recent years, which 
seems to challenge the presence of a prevailing canon given 
that it reveals the possibility of articulating a plurality of possible 
perspectives of one set of events. Ankermist’s statement is 
symptomatic of the plurality of narratives from which the 
present can read the past. He writes: 
Integral historiography leads to enumeration rather than to 
integration. […] That is why, if we were to try to find a new 
jacket for historiography, as considered necessary above, the 
most important problem would be to situate historiography 
within present-day civilization as a whole. This problem is of a 
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cultural-historical, oral and interpretative nature and could be 
compared with the sort of problem which we sometimes pose 
ourselves when considering the place and the meaning of a 
particular event within the totality of our life-history. In general, 
it is strange that historians and philosophers of history have paid 
so little attention over the last forty years to parallels between 
the development of present-day historiography on the one 
hand and that of literature, literary criticism, printing—in short, 
civilization—on the other (ANKERSMIT 1989, p. 139).
The dual criticism—historical and metahistorical—of the 
notion of narrative as well as the possibility of great narratives 
carries with it the loss of its condition as a dispenser of historic 
value to the elements which make up its structure. In other 
words, the classic documents of the historian no longer have 
historical value to the extent that they are transmitted and 
represented on the basis of the format of the narrative. Rather, 
they now acquire value for themselves. Proof of this is the 
biographic turn evidenced in the historiography of the previous 
century, starting in the 1970s. Alejandro Baer describes the 
connection between these two processes: 
The irruption—or return—of biographical perspective, both in 
social and historical research and in different sociocultural fields 
(literature, journalism, etc) cannot be detached from the “crisis 
of representation.” Generally speaking, the autobiographical 
turn in its different manifestations reflects the rupture of (great) 
narratives which established historical and cultural legitimacy, 
and seeks new discursive ways, like personal narratives, that 
engage with new shattered sociabilities, the media culture and 
the traumatic events of the twentieth century (BAER 2005, p. 
33).
As a consequence of the fragmentation of great narratives, 
the production of historical knowledge became more plural 
and biased, and started a new relationship with one of its 
sources: testimony. As stated in the title of Annete Wiviorka’s 
famous book, the history of the past century was the “era 
of the witness.” This work emerges from a historiographic 
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reality: the testimonial explosion of the previous century was 
a consequence of the historical interest in the phenomenon of 
the Holocaust which  started manifesting itself after the famous 
Eichmann trial in 1961.
The “advent” of the witness figure in the decades after the 
Holocaust created an unusual situation for the historian. This 
was due not only to the issue of the number of testimonies 
(between 1944 and 1948 a total of 7,300 testimonies were 
collected) but also to the fact that witnesses revealed visions 
of their biographic experiences that were so personal, partial, 
and ethically charged that it was impossible to assimilate the 
plurality of the extant perspectives into a singular narrative 
without generalizing and abstracting a great deal of the 
semantic content that comprises testimonial representation. 
As is outlined by Wieviroka: 
The witness is the bearer of an experience that, albeit unique, 
does not stand on its own, but only in the testimonial situation 
in which it takes place. It must be recognized that, in a way, 
Shoah revolutionized testimony. It transformed it into something 
beyond the history of historians, into a work of art (WIEVIORKA 
2006, p. 83).
The portrayal of events provided by the witness is so 
intimate that it resists being totalized into an objective historic 
representation. Rather, it seems to contain a potential that 
transcends the limits of traditional historiography. It is not 
surprising that some testimonies have found a better space 
of expression in literature rather than history. Whereas 
witnesses to these events have found a space of expression in 
historiography, literature has proven optimal for them to invoke 
a moral obligation. As a result of the Eichmann trial, the witness 
figure became the center of media attention with the aim of 
giving the world a moral lesson. This performative function, 
that radical singularity of the witness, cannot be integrated into 
the reconciliatory and unidirectional framework of narrative. As 
Shoshana Felman (FELMAN; LAUB 1992) remarked in her study 
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on post-holocaust testimony, if the Holocaust demonstrated 
anything, it was that each of its singular perspectives was 
irreducibly unique. Evidently, the “testimonial explosion” not 
only affects the teleological plane, “the meaning of the end” of 
the historical tale, but it also encroaches on the idiosyncrasy of 
historical agents. 
Traditionally, historiography has focused on a predetermined 
group of historical agents, considered to be the most powerful of 
their time. Ancient history revolved around figures like Caesar 
or Cleopatra, whereas the history of the twentieth century 
concentrated on figures like Hitler and Stalin. Since history is 
individualized through references to concrete personalities, 
they become attributes with enormous causal power in history. 
Löwy’s (2005) work, following Benjamin’s theses, suggests 
this prioritization of historical agents results from the ancillary 
character of historiography with respect to the social and 
political order from which, retrospectively, the events are 
interpreted. The focus of the narrative of the past onto these 
figures has been translated into the interpretation of world 
history as political history. As a consequence, great historical 
events were narrated resulting from the interrelations between 
the intentional actions of concrete historical agents. This 
narrative received considerable amount of criticism throughout 
the twentieth century, primarily from the Annales school. 
Some historians such as Fernand Braudel (1992) and Marc 
Bloch (1984) denounced this model of historical presentation 
for transfiguring the image of the past by pivoting around 
individual decisions and actions. According to them, traditional 
narratives had made it impossible to transform history into 
scientific discourse. Siegfried Kracauer expresses this through a 
metaphor. “Thus a magnet gathers scattered iron particles from 
a mass of material. For this reason group behavior is more rigid, 
more calculable than individual behavior” (KRACAUER 1995, 
p. 23). As a consequence, the Annales school assumed that 
turning history into a science required the use of quantitative 
techniques appropriate for social sciences. This modification 
altered the status of historical agents: they went from being 
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great figures with names and titles to a grouping of impersonal 
far-reaching forces with stable long-term economic, social 
and demographic structures. Historical agents become mere 
products of these combinations of anonymous forces. 
That being said, in opposition to both older forms of historic 
narrative as well as to the serial anti-narrative of the Annales 
school, a new type of historical writing has developed since the 
1960s in parallel with the development of oral history. This type 
of writing questions the dichotomy derived from the contrast 
between the two previous models: a narrative historiography 
centered around history’s great figures and an anti-narrative 
historiography lacking references to historical personages. I 
am referring to the rise of microhistory: a model of historical 
writing that reflects the plurality of narratives and perspectives 
by encompassing a variety of historical experiences. This 
model rises from the ruins of the great narratives, stoked by 
the ones bellow the “testimonial explosion.” It encompasses 
heterogeneous perspectives, in no way reducible to the optics 
of an account told on a larger scale. 
The term “microhistory” has its origin in George R. 
Steward’s book Picketts’ Charge (STEWART 1963). It refers to 
a method of investigation and historical writing that subverts 
traditional historiography without abandoning the narrative. 
The perspective of the historians espousing microhistory is 
that the history focused on great subjects is profoundly biased, 
since it studies the behavior of collectives as derived from the 
actions and decisions of a group of individuals in the social 
spheres of power. In this sense, microhistory presents itself as 
a restitution of minor history, popular figures, and the classes 
that lack direct power in the decision-making but that have 
a greater demographic weight. Microhistory does not identify 
itself with the Annales’ impersonal macro-historical project. 
Its modes of investigation are not at all quantitative and 
it does not use statistics to study the customs of historical 
collectives. Rather than transforming historical subjects into 
mere functions which led through anonymous tendencies, 
70
Rafael Pérez Baquero
Hist. Historiogr. v. 13, n. 32, jan.-abr, ano 2020, p. 47-81 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v13i32.1494
microhistory constructs accounts based on the biographies 
of concrete subjects with names and surnames. It is for this 
reason that  Braudel, a French historian, identified microhistory 
with traditional historiography and considered it to be a model 
of investigation and writing in which history is the product of 
the intentional action of concrete subjects. 
But Braudel’s interpretation cannot be adapted to the 
investigative model of microhistory. First, the value of the 
examined historical subjects does not derive from their 
potential to rule the action of collectives but rather from their 
status as a symptom with respect to those collectives. After all, 
microhistorical accounts do not describe the lives of characters 
who achieved an exceptional status within a social body but 
rather the lives of members of the popular classes. As Carlo 
Ginzburg writes in his essay: “Microhistory: Two or three things 
I know about it,” (GINZBURG 1994) microhistory is about 
transforming into a book what would have been a footnote in a 
conventional monograph. It is about describing the experiences 
of regular individuals in order to reconstruct their social and 
moral world. After all, members of the popular classes are not 
only documents for historians but are also exemplary of the 
context they inhabit. 
In this sense, microhistory departs from the premise 
according to which, given the multitude of possible points of 
view from the past, the best way of accessing this knowledge 
is through phenomena which constitute indices or symptoms 
of more general historical situations. As Giovanni Levi suggests 
(LEVI 1993), it is about avoiding the sacrifice of knowledge on 
particular events for the sake of generalizations and historical 
abstractions. After all, if historians want to give meaning to 
individual experiences—for example, the life of the miller at the 
center of Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the Worms (GINZBURG 
1976)—they should reconstruct the culture in which all those 
who intervene in his or her way of life participate. Thus, micro-
history is about transforming the biographies of conventional 
individuals into a micro-cosmos that reflects the popular 
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culture of their era, with all its unique characteristic irreducible 
to the great narratives. Microhistory respects the plurality of 
different experiences of all social strata and historical groups 
and conforms to a representation of the past fully conscious of 
its own relativity and partiality. 
To sum up, meta-accounts have given way to biographies 
of the members of popular classes. Microhistories are 
constructed from new identities without the totalizing impulse 
that has shaped the greater part of the traditional narrative. 
The development of this historiographical current reveals the 
impossibility of being able to continue applying the premise 
of the “great narratives”: that all particular historical data 
had value only when forming part of a larger-scale narrative. 
Furthermore, this development illustrates how historiography 
endorsed the same plurality and heterogeneity that had been 
ascribed to the depiction of the past that came from collective 
memory. 
Conclusion. Writing a Present-Past History: Between 
the Historian and the Judge
Contemporaneity with the past that the historian attempts to 
describe, the radical singularity of testimony and the traumatic 
character of many events that one needs to narrate all lead 
to the following conclusion: rather than being an exception, 
the effect of ethical-political factors on history operates as 
a systematic rule. By developing Walter Benjamin’s ideas, I 
suggest, as indicated earlier, that the key feature of the history 
of the present is the permeability of the border between writing 
history and these ethical-political factors of the collective 
memory. In order to conclude the analysis of the intertwinement 
between past and present I will focus on this permeability, and 
analyze the relationship between the historian and the judge. 
In order to elucidate the dynamics between these two roles, the 
analysis will emphasize the relationship between the historian 
of extreme events and the judge of “crimes against humanity.” 
Thus, the figure of the judge will serve as a lens through which 
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one can interpret the influence of ethical-political factors on 
historiography. This analysis will refute the last thesis quoted 
at the beginning of this paper, according to which the tales 
that come from collective memory have always dramatized and 
moralized historical agents whereas historical works provide a 
value-free account of events. In his famous paragraph German 
historian Leopold von Ranke asserted: “History has often been 
assigned the task of judging the past so as to teach one’s 
contemporaries for the benefits of future years. The present 
work […] wants only to show how things actually were” (RANKE 
1885, p. 8). By taking Benjamin’s influence on the present 
these aspirations are to be considered untenable. After all, as 
Kittsteiner clarified, Ranke’s thesis “was directed against certain 
politization of historical research. Benjamin seems to want to 
restore historiography to this political function, albeit with quite 
a different theoretical armature” (KITTSTEINER 1986, p. 180). 
To introduce these topics on contemporary historiography, I 
will begin with the following idea suggested by Carlo Ginzburg 
in “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historians”:
Evidence, like clue or proof, is a crucial word for the historian and 
the judge. This affinity implies convergences, and divergences as 
well, which have been recognized for a long time. Some recent 
developments in the historian’s work shed new light on this old 
topic (GINZBURG 1991, p. 14).
Ginzburg argues that an intimate relationship between the 
judge and the historian has existed since antiquity and it has 
become more intimate in our history of the present. There are 
also methodological similarities between their work. Each one 
bases his or her work on facts offered by the past, in its traces 
to reconstruct causal chains. It is true that originally the labor 
of historians and that of lawyers have corresponded to different 
systems of rules. Nevertheless, some historical periods allow 
us to appreciate their interdependent relationship. After the 
advent of modernity and the processes of secularization, the 
axiological order to which one could appeal could no longer be 
found in the other world but rather became inherent to history. 
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As Koselleck summarizes: “The morals of history became 
temporalized in history as a process […] The renouncement of 
compensatory justice in the beyond led to the temporization 
of this justice. History hic et nunc attains an ineluctable 
character.” (KOSELLECK 2001, p. 63). This statement burdens 
the historian with the task of elaborating an account of the past 
from which individual guilt and responsibility can be derived. 
After all, determining that the action of X led to Y, transforms X 
into the intentional agent of a phenomenon that can be given 
meaningful semantic content for the collective at whom the 
account is aimed. And so, it is possible to appreciate how the 
work of the historian and that of the judge converge. Historians 
do not only explain or represent but they also report the 
events through a narrative that gathers information and offers 
evidence with respect to the human agents that triggered such 
events. They reconstruct both the course of the events that 
have actually happened and the course of other hypothetical 
events that could have resulted from different decisions and 
different intents. As Charles Maier puts it: “The historian, 
like the judge, has the duty of constructing a jurisprudential 
narrative [that] relies primarily on contextualization to establish 
what constituted culpable or nonculpable or even praiseworthy 
action” (MAIER 2003, p. 300).
Consequently, the peculiarities of our history of the present 
have caused the relationship between the historian and the 
judge to become rather “agonistic” for being tied to historical 
events that require a historical gaze and retrospective judgment. 
After all, it is naive to presuppose a value-free neutrality, when 
the historian confronts a phenomenon legally characterized as 
“crime against humanity.” 
The relationship between the judge and the historian is 
bidirectional and reciprocal. On the one hand, describing a 
historical event like the Holocaust by revealing its causes, 
agents and factors, implies categorizing it as a “crime against 
humanity” on an unprecedented scale. On the other hand, these 
moral and legal revindications supported by the information 
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offered by the historian continue to influence the design of 
his or her accounts. This mutual influence does not mean that 
the facts are infinitely malleable nor that the historical register 
allows for any kind of interpretation or manipulation. It simply 
shows the influence of one sphere on the other and allows one 
to understand the familial similarities between the historian 
and the judge, a constant of the history of the present. 
In order to prove the connection between the two spheres, 
it is crucial to address the controversies stemming from the 
sometimes quite complex relationship between the ethical 
backdrop of the Holocaust and historiography’s pretense of 
impartiality. 
In a chapter called “Truth and Circumstance” (WHITE 
2014, p. 25-40) in The Practical Past, Hayden White poses the 
following question: To what do we owe the fact that when a 
historian articulates the question “Is it true that X?”—where X 
is any historical phenomenon—it does not pose any problems, 
but is a legitimate question in relation to the idea of truth 
and the accuracy of historiography, whereas formulating this 
same question substituting the Holocaust for X arouses such 
considerable rebuff? In other words, one may ask why there 
are so many arguments when historians put the veracity 
of the Holocaust into question. In this sense, there is no 
common measure between the historian’s ideals of truth and 
of critique and the witness’s authority. An evidence of this 
incommensurability has been revealed in the indictment of 
historians who have negated the existence of the Holocaust. 
Similarly, conservative historians like Nolte, Stürmer, or 
Hillgruber come under criticism for relativizing the responsibility 
of the German society for the occurrence of Nazi crimes. But 
the question cannot be reduced to this problem. The question 
of whether it is true that the Holocaust occurred does not 
allude to the relationship between this query and reality. On 
the contrary, what arises is the question of what motives, both 
ethical and political, can a historian have for questioning the 
facticity of the Holocaust. In other words, it presupposes from 
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the beginning the interference of these motives in the process 
of writing history. 
The fact that it is from such a social context that the 
question “is it true that the Holocaust occurred?” is valued 
as morally pernicious, indicates that in this conversational 
context, the question does not have a merely declarative 
function. It cannot be answered with simple yes/no, true/false. 
On the contrary, it involves a plurality of elements that makes 
the speech act derived from historiography itself more complex 
and complicated. It is precisely in relation to this problem that 
Hayden White appeals to Austin’s theory on performative speech 
acts (AUSTIN 1975) to elaborate an analysis that will support 
the following thesis: Whoever attempts to write a history of the 
present and refers to traumatic events, that not only have a 
historical value but also an ethical and political one, performs 
perlocutionary acts that not only describe the world but transform 
it. The historiographical depiction of these events cannot be 
considered detached from the ethic-political struggle regarding 
whether their memories should be recovered or forsaken. On 
the contrary, those struggles projected into historiographical 
academy bring a political and ethical concern that emerge from 
the possibility of these events being forgotten or denied. These 
continuous trends within the historical discourse cast a light 
on the understanding of history which has some resemblances 
with Walter Benjamin’s ideas quoted at the beginning of the 
paper. After all, the conclusion that has been drawn could be 
framed within an understanding about the writing of history 
which denies any detachment between past and present and 
which echoes Walter Benjamin’s theses according to which: 
“Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it 
“the way it really was.” It means appropriating a memory as it 
flashes up in a moment of danger” (BENJAMIN 2006, p. 391). 
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